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Abstract 
As the question of Muslim women’s dress codes comes under intense media 
and political scrutiny, two competing discourses have emerged. The first of 
these discourses centres around the veil (in whatever form) as a symbol of 
patriarchal force. The second discourse has emerged largely in response to 
the first, and asserts that covering is an exercise in women’s choice and a 
symbol of female empowerment. This paper argues that neither of these 
discourses adequately describes the complex negotiations that Muslim 
women employ with regard to dress. I discuss the discourse of ‘force’ with 
regard to media imagery of Taliban era Afghanistan, and ‘choice’ with 
regard to contemporary Australia, grappling with the issue of how to 
challenge the representation of the Muslim women’s dress as a symbol of 
oppression without reinforcing its standing as a symbol of cultural loyalty. 
 
[keywords: Islam, women, hijab, dress code] 
 
Introduction 
The focus on Muslim women’s dress has been so intense and most of the time so 
unhelpful in developing any understanding of the lived experience of the women 
concerned that any new paper on the issue has to begin by justifying its own existence.  
 
Many Muslim women in particular share the weary sentiment that there have been more 
than enough hijab-themed rows, debates, and academic papers to last us a lifetime. Yet 
it is clear that despite all the ‘hijab rows’ that have taken place in Australian public 
discourse, Muslim women still face serious limitations in the ways of speaking available 
to us when it comes to hijab and to other gender issues. The intensity of the debate has 
meant that an 
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‘either/or’ mindset has taken hold – either the hijab is a freely chosen symbol of 
empowerment, or it is a symbol of the power of Muslim men over their ‘enslaved’ 
women. Tiresome though it may be, we need to keep talking about hijab, and allowing 
our ways of discussing it to evolve. Otherwise, some of those Muslim women who do 
not feel that their life experiences are reflected in Australian ‘Muslim’ discourse about 
the hijab may well take the only other option apparent to them, and join the chorus of 
voices denouncing the hijab as a threat to Australian gender norms. 
 
This paper argues the inadequacy of the discourses of ‘force’ versus ‘choice’ with 
reference to the cases of women in Afghanistan and Australia1. I argue that while each 
of these discourses adequately describes the experiences of some Muslim women, many 
Muslim women ‘negotiate’ rather than ‘choose’ over issues such as dress, and they do 
not negotiate on equal terms. They may deploy one or other of these force/choice 
discourses according to need, despite the fact that both are oversimplifications. But 
despite the usefulness of such simplifications, they hold inherent risks because of the 
tendency for a discourse produced in one site to leak into another. 
 
The various interpretations of the relevant religious texts referring to dress are outside 
the scope of this paper. Women’s decisions about wearing hijab are not solely governed 
by their personal beliefs as to whether or not their religion requires it. Some women 
believe that hijab is a religious obligation, but don’t wear it; others believe that it is not, 
but wear it anyway. The focus here is on the non-theological factors that give rise to 
such complexities. 
 
Nor is this paper a denunciation of past contributions to ‘hijab rows’. In the face of 
discrimination and harassment of women wearing hijab, a response was developed and 
delivered (if not always adequately reported) in a way that gave voice to the women 
who were the most intimately concerned, but who were in danger of being entirely 
silenced. A decade ago, the idea that a woman might wear hijab of her own volition 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on personal encounters rather than systematic fieldwork. However, I sought 
feedback on the general concepts, and in some cases shared excerpts of the draft, with a number of 
Australian Muslim women, both hijabis and non-hijabis. I thank them for their open-minded approach 
and invaluable comments. The author also wishes to thank Christina Ho and Tanja Dreher for their 
support and advice. 
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rather than at the behest of her male relatives was an unfamiliar concept to most non-
Muslim Australians. 
Although levels of harassment of hijab-wearing women have risen sharply since 9/11 
(Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 2004) and expressions of hostility 
from media and politicians have gathered intensity, the concept of hijab as ‘choice’ is 
no longer so novel to Australian public discourse. Although many Australians still do 
not accept it, they are at least likely to have encountered it. It was necessary, and it 
continues to be necessary, to defend a woman’s right to wear hijab, free from 
harassment and abuse. However, danger arises from the fact that rather than being seen 
as a strategy that should and must evolve with changing social circumstances, certain 
ways of talking about hijab have come to be seen as sacrosanct. Neither Australian 
public discourse nor the sociology of Australian Muslims have remained static in the 
years since ‘hijab rows’ began. Accordingly, we cannot allow our ways of talking about 
hijab to remain in stasis. 
 
Muslim women are caught in a classic double bind between patriarchy and racism. As 
Christina Ho writes: 
While [minority women] face racism and sexism from the majority society, 
they also confront sexism and male domination in the own community. In 
this bind, speaking out about oppressive practices in their own community, 
such as gendered violence, can result in being treated like a traitor by their 
own community, while also reinforcing negative stereotypes of the majority 
society of oppressive, backward cultures (Ho 2007: 296). 
 
In Australia, this was illustrated in 2006 during the controversy surrounding the speech 
given by Sheik Taj al din al Hilali in which he compared immodestly dressed women to 
“uncovered meat”, offering temptation to “cats”. “If the woman is in her boudoir, in her 
house and if she’s wearing the veil and if she shows modesty, disasters don’t happen” 
(Mattar 2006: np). Many Australian Muslim women were horrified by Hilali’s remarks 
(although he also had his female supporters), but equally appalled to find themselves at 
the centre of a bullying political and media row in which ‘the Muslim community’ was 
called upon to ‘deal with’ Hilali, or face the consequences. In some quarters, 
responsibility for Hilali’s remarks was placed not only with him and his supporters, but 
with Australian Muslims in general. Muslim women (including myself) who spoke out 
against the attitudes embodied by Hilali found their voices appropriated by those who 
wished to illustrate that Islam was by nature a violent and misogynist religion. 
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Conversations about Muslim dress codes are similarly caught in a double bind, between 
those like Bronwyn Bishop and Fred Nile who see hijab as a dangerous threat to 
Australian society, and those like Hilali and Sheik Faiz on the other who see 
‘immodesty’ as cultural and religious treason, if not incitement to rape. This has set the 
scene for two competing discourses: one centred around the theme of hijab as a symbol 
of patriarchal ‘force’ and another around the theme of hijab as ‘choice’. In attempting to 
problematise these discourses, I feel the full force of the double-bind. By seeking to 
complicate the discourse of hijab-as-choice, I risk giving aid and comfort to those who 
attack hijabis in the national parliament, in the media, and on the street. By challenging 
the notion of hijab-as-force, I risk appearing to defend regimes and social forces that 
impose mandatory covering and/or hold Hilali-esque attitudes to non-veiling. In this 
face of this dilemma, the temptation to stay silent is almost overwhelming.  
 
This scope of this paper is ‘Muslim dress codes’ rather than simply ‘hijab’ (which 
literally means “curtain” but has come to refer to the headscarf worn by many Muslim 
women) in part because it also discusses the discourse on Afghan women and the 
burqua, but also because even in the West, the issue of Muslim women’s dress is much 
more wide-ranging than a concern with headscarves. For example, in Australia, few 
families of Pakistani background would expect their daughters to wear hijab, and many 
are actively hostile to it. However, they may nonetheless enforce prohibitions on form 
fitting jeans or blouses that would be acceptable in some Arab families where hijab is an 
accepted norm. Women who wear the hijab by choice may nonetheless find themselves 
in conflict with their families and social networks over other dress related issues 
(translucent fabric, the cut of their clothes, make-up, whether or not to cover the feet, 
etc). During the furore that followed al-Hilali’s speech, a television channel ran a profile 
of his family, in which his daughter (suitably hijab-clad) defended him – only to attract 
negative comments from some Muslims for her ‘un-Islamic’ plucked eyebrows2. While 
‘hijab’ (in the sense of headscarf) is a convenient shorthand term, it does not adequately 
convey these complexities. 
 
I respect and share the positive associations that many Muslim women hold towards 
hijab; I do not believe that Muslim women should be ‘persuaded’ or ‘educated’ to 
abandon hijab any more than I believe that they should be forced to do so. However, I 
                                                 
2 In conversations and in chatrooms: 
<http://forums.muslimvillage.net/lofiversion/index.php/t28161.html> 
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do not believe that all of the factors that currently affect women’s decision to cover (or 
not) are positive, and (in common with many hijabis) I do not believe that it should be 
used as a signifier of authenticity. As someone who has spoken out against ‘anti-hijab’ 
voices such as Bronwyn Bishop and Leslie Cannold, I face a dilemna: how do I defend 
women’s right to wear hijab, free from discrimination and harassment, without also 
reinforcing the position of hijab as a symbol of ‘real’ Muslim womanhood, which I have 
no desire to do?  
 
Afghanistan and the discourse of ‘force’ 
Australian representations of Islamic dress as a symbol of patriarchal control are 
underpinned by the examples of state-enforced dress codes in societies such as Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, and Afghanistan. Yet although such controls undoubtedly exist and are 
often brutally enforced, a gap remains between the ways that Islamic dress codes are 
understood by the women concerned (even those who resist such codes) and the way 
they are represented in Western-dominated discourses of force. 
 
The “Stop Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan” campaign, led by the US-based Feminist 
Majority, provides interesting points of reflection on the issue of Muslim women’s dress 
and patriarchal ‘force’. International coverage of Taliban atrocities fetishised the 
burqua, which was displayed in countless media montages and snipped into blue 
squares which the Feminist Majority Foundation sold for $5, to be worn “in solidarity” 
with Afghan women (Kolhatkar 2003: np). In a special performance of Eve Ensler's 
play, The Vagina Monologues, a burqua was symbolically lifted to reveal the face of an 
Afghan woman. This woman was rendered as incapable of lifting her veil for herself; 
the task of unveiling was left to talk-show host Oprah Winfrey (Lerner 2001: 54). This 
type of depiction, in which Western women were the headline act, while Afghan women 
were reduced to cameo roles in their own struggle, became a source of increasing 
resentment.  
 
Orientalist stereotypes of downtrodden Afghan women were generated by Western 
media and some Western feminist campaigners rather than by Afghan women 
themselves. Afghan women tended to accord much less symbolic weight to the burqua 
than did the international campaign that sought to liberate them. They were far more 
preoccupied with immediate issues of survival amid war and deprivation. However, as I 
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witnessed during fieldwork in Pakistan during 2000 and 2001, some Afghan women 
were willing deploy the Western fetishisation of the veil when dealing with the media if 
that was what was necessary to raise international awareness of their situation. It may be 
argued that this type of ‘strategic essentialism’ was necessary in order to gain media 
attention and puncture Western indifference at a time of acute crisis. Certainly, despite 
my deep discomfort at some of the Orientalist imagery involved, my own belief at the 
time was that it might be desirable, even necessary, to deploy misplaced stereotypes in 
the face of such a catastrophic level of organised patriarchal violence.  
 
Witnessing the feminist campaign against the Taliban, which I observed both in 
Australia and among Afghan women in Pakistan, brought home to me the rather 
obvious point that the ‘transnational’ element of transnational feminism means that 
discourse formed in one political environment will inevitably leak into others. Concerns 
about racist stereotyping, which loomed large in the lives of Australian Muslims, 
including myself, seemed very remote during my conversations with Afghan women in 
Pakistan. Here, the immediate enemy were violent and Islamically-named patriarchal 
militias. There was a strong sense among many Afghans that the outside world, which 
had taken an interest in Afghans when they had been the brave guerrillas fighting Soviet 
imperialism, had afterwards forgotten them. They were often not much concerned if 
Western media reports or support campaigns (which most Afghans of course never saw 
for themselves) were a-historical, Orientalist, and even at times crypto-racist, provided 
that they adequately communicated to the outside world the prevailing sense of crisis. I 
came to share this attitude to the extent that without consciously being aware of the fact, 
I regarded the feminist campaign for Afghan women and the anti-racist campaign that 
encompassed the rights of asylum seekers as two entirely separate and different spheres 
in which different language, tactics and discourse could be deployed. 
 
Of course, subsequent events revealed that they were no such thing. For one thing, the 
reductionist portrayal of Afghan gender relationships heightened Western fear and 
suspicion of Afghan men; fear which had very concrete repercussions when Afghan 
refugees attempted to find sanctuary in the West, including Australia. On the issue of 
immigration and asylum, sympathy for Afghan women was far outweighed by fear of 
their husbands, sons, and brothers. Furthermore, in the weeks following 9/11, the de-
historicised and uni-faceted campaign was easily appropriated for the propaganda 
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purposes of the ‘war on terror’. After September 11, the “Stop Gender Apartheid in 
Afghanistan” campaign dovetailed with the propaganda campaign supporting Operation 
Enduring Freedom, in a synthesis of feminism and militarism. The Feminist Majority 
literature expresses it thus: “by mid November, the Bush administration was giving 
speeches that could have been lifted directly from the organisation's literature” (Brown, 
Rounds et al. 2002: 74). Afghan women’s opinions on the bombing of their country and 
the restoration of power to the Northern Alliance were seldom sought. They were 
required only to symbolize Taliban oppression, and for this purpose, the sight of the 
burqua-clad woman was all that was required. 
 
Australia and the discourse of ‘choice’ 
My observation of the transnational campaign for Afghan women sensitized me to the 
dangers of strategically deploying discourses that are too easily appropriated for other 
purposes. In Australia, Muslim women have generated a discourse in relation to dress, 
in response not to patriarchal control but to an ethnocentric characterisation of hijab as 
an alien symbol of patriarchal force. Muslim women wearing hijab have been subjected 
to discrimination and harassment, and to attempts to forcibly ‘unveil’ them (Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 2004). We have responded with a discourse 
that emphasises hijab as a personal ‘choice’, as a symbol of empowerment and an 
instrument of female liberation (from sexualised cultural imagery of women’s bodies). 
This association of hijab and choice has become a common refrain among Muslim 
women living in the West. 
 
Tanja Dreher and Frances Simmons have written an account of an Australian workshop 
where this representation of hijab was selected as a strategic response to endless public 
questioning about “why do you wear that thing?” (Dreher and Simmons 2006: 117). The 
presentation of hijab as ‘choice’ (like the use of the burqua to symbolise ‘force’) made a 
bite-sized, easily digestible media message, although as the authors observe, it meant 
erasing other rationales that were considered too complicated or unlikely to receive a 
sympathetic reception. 
 
Some Muslim women use the term ‘choice’ with regard to hijab as an ideal (it should be 
about choice), but others talk about it though it is as an existing reality, which for many 
women and girls, it is not. While some women do make the autonomous choice as to 
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whether or not to wear hijab, others (hijabi and non-hijbai alike) do not. Choice is a 
meaningless concept when the choice involves negotiating racist prejudice and 
harassment on the one hand, and/or family and community conflict and pressure on the 
other. If you are not wearing hijab for fear of harassment on the street and 
discrimination in the workplace, are you really making an autonomous choice? 
Similarly, if you wear hijab in order to deflect family or community disapproval, is that 
really a choice? 
 
An additional complication is that those who talk about ‘choice’ with regard to 
women’s dress codes do not always mean the same thing. For some speakers, hijab is a 
‘choice’ because they do not believe that it is stipulated in the Qur’an or Sunnah. It is 
therefore not an Islamic requirement but a ‘choice’ made by individual women. This 
interpretation has been taken as the justification for an ‘anti-hijab’ argument by some 
Muslim and non-Muslim speakers: since hijab is not required by Islam, it is permissible 
for governments, school authorities, and so forth to ban it from public spaces (Adonis 
2003: np). In Australia, the number of Muslims publicly taking such a stance is 
vanishingly small. More commonly, those who do not themselves believe that hijab is 
mandated by the Qur’an accept that other women should be free to believe otherwise 
and to act on that belief, or to use hijab as a symbol of religious identity. In fact, some 
women who subscribe to this theological understanding nonetheless wear hijab in order 
to show solidarity with other Muslim women, as a reminder to themselves of their faith, 
to signify their rejection of the the sexualisation of women's bodies, or simply because it 
holds positive associations for them. Amina Wudud, an African American Muslim 
scholar who made international headlines when she became the first female imam 
recorded as having led mixed-gender prayers, is one prominent example of this attitude:  
As a descendant of African slave women, I have carried the awareness that 
my ancestors were not given any choice to determine how much of their 
bodies would be exposed at the auction block or their living conditions. So, 
I chose intentionally to cover my body as a means reflecting my historical 
identity, personal dignity, and sexual integrity (Wadud 2006: 221). 
 
Other Muslims say that it is a ‘choice’, but simultaneously describe it as ‘mandatory’ or 
‘obligatory’. This apparent contradiction can lead to confusion among non-Muslims 
when Muslim women on the one hand defend hijab as a personal choice and on the 
other say that it must not be prohibited because it is mandatory for them. The notion of 
hijab as a ‘voluntary obligation’ can be explained as meaning that while Muslim women 
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are obliged by their faith to wear the hijab, they should not be coerced into doing so – 
they must be allowed to choose for themselves to accept this obligation. This is the 
position taken by Tariq Ramadan, whose writing on Muslim identity in Europe has been 
highly influential (Roy 2004). Similarly, the European Council for Fatwas and Research 
pronounced that hijab was “a devotional obligation and a duty prescribed by the Islamic 
Law”, but continued that it had to be based on personal conviction (Shadid and Van 
Koningsveld 2005: 36). Some speakers continue by observing that it is not necessarily 
the most important obligation and we should not allow ourselves to become obsessed 
with it. Other forms of proper Islamic conduct take a higher priority. And some women 
who consider hijab to be a religious obligation do not wear it, because they do not wish 
to make themselves a target of discrimination and harassment. 
 
Another and to my mind more troubling group are those who mean that hijab is a 
‘choice’ when living in Australia or other non-Muslim societies, because in such 
circumstances Muslims are obliged to follow the law of the land, and the law allows 
women to choose not to cover. However, they defend the right of Muslim governments 
such as Saudi Arabia and Iran to enforce hijab. Choice has its limits, as Jamal Badawi, 
from the North American Fiqh Council relates:  
societies have the right to set reasonable limits on choices so as not to harm 
society at large or its ‘moral values’. It is in the same vain [sic] that it would 
not be inappropriate for an Islamic state to set those reasonable limits 
(Anon: np). 
 
This last proviso on ‘choice’ is not often explicitly spelled out, but arises when the 
subject of conversation switches from Australia to the Islamic societies concerned. 
There are many objections to be raised against this position, but for the purposes of this 
discussion, the most relevant one is that it seems an unsustainable use of the word 
‘choice’: My choice to cover, not yours to uncover. 
 
The multiple meanings ascribed to ‘choice’ raises difficulties when Muslim women are 
grouped together to defend hijab as women’s ‘choice’ as though they are all talking 
about the same thing. Obviously, these different understandings of ‘choice’ represent 
wildly divergent worldviews, yet for the most part (and despite the care taken by some 
speakers to articulate a more complex worldview) they are folded together into a 
general ‘pro-hijab’ discourse. And (as with the transnational campaign for Afghan 
women), this discourse is able to ‘leak’ from one political site to another. In Pakistan, I 
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spent time with the women’s wing of the religious party, the Jamaat-i-Islami. The 
French prohibition on hijab in public schools was an immensely important issue for 
them, and they expressed their support for their French sisters through gestures of 
solidarity such as street demonstrations. But of course, although they spoke of a French 
Muslim woman’s right to ‘choose’ hijab, they were not demonstrating in favour of a 
universal principle of ‘choice’ – as part of the ruling coalition in Pakistan’s North West 
Frontier Province, the Jamaat-i-Islami is seeking to enforce hijab on women working in 
public spaces.  
 
Choice/force vs negotiation 
Hijab has become much more common throughout the Muslim world over the past 
couple of decades, shifting from a non-conformist option to a common (but by no 
means universal) social norm. Young women wearing the hijab today still face the same 
issues of discrimination and harassment as did an earlier generation, if anything at a 
higher intensity. However, in other regards, their experience of hijab is very different to 
that of middle-aged hijabis. These women were very often ‘first generation’ hijabis, 
whose mothers did not cover and whose families may in fact have opposed their 
decision to do so, either because they regarded it as a sign of religious fanaticism, of 
‘Arab imperialism’ (in the case of some non-Arab ethnicities), or because they were 
afraid of the negative attention that it attracted. When hijab was still regarded as a non-
conformist option even among Muslims, it was much more clear that those women who 
wore it had reached an autonomous choice. 
 
These attitudes have not entirely disappeared from Australian Muslim communities, and 
some young women still face opposition from their families when they begin to wear 
hijab. Hijab remains much more common in some ethnic communities than others. 
However, many young Muslim women have now grown up with it as a social norm and 
a parental expectation, and in such circumstances it is far less obvious when it is and is 
not a choice. 
 
To take one (hypothetical but fact-based) scenario: a teenage girl says that she chose to 
begin wearing hijab when she was twelve, but on closer examination it would perhaps 
be more accurate to say that she chose the moment at which to begin wearing hijab. It 
was always her family’s intention that she should begin wearing hijab when she was no 
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longer a little girl (sometimes but not always defined by a definite point such as 
menstruation), and like many twelve year olds, she was ready to leave little-girlhood 
behind her. Had she failed to reach that decision by age sixteen, it would have been a 
source of significant family conflict. Depending on other circumstances, she could still 
reasonably describe this as her own choice, but it is a different kind of choice to that 
made by her mother, who was raised with quite different parental expectations. 
 
This does not mean that young women who have been raised with family expectations 
or even family coercion as to dress code (and of course, most non-Muslim families also 
have expectations as to dress code) are victims of brainwashing or ‘false consciousness’ 
when they describe themselves as possessing ‘choice’. Some young women 
unhesitatingly accept their families’ values with regard to dress. However, in other cases 
their use of the word ‘choice’ may in part be due to their non-acceptance of the 
alternative discourse of ‘force’, with all its attendant connotations of violent Taliban-
style barbarism and helpless female victims. For some women, adherence to a dress 
code may not be their first preference, but neither do they feel enormously burdened by 
it. For others, acquiescence on the issue of dress provides the family harmony necessary 
for seeking greater personal autonomy in other areas, such as education, work, 
relationships, and personal mobility. This form of negotiation has been well-
documented elsewhere in Muslim communities elsewhere. Claire Dwyer reports that the 
young South Asian Muslim women in Britain were deploying religious discourse to 
validate their creation of hybrid styles of dress that nonetheless remained ‘Islamic’: 
By evoking this Islamic authority, individuals were able to argue 
that not only should they be able to dress in a style which was 
both “western” and “Islamic” but that they should also have 
greater freedoms to go out or go on to higher education and to 
be fully involved in the choice of marriage partner (Dwyer 
2000: 482). 
 
‘Negotiation’ also describes the experience of some women who report that they would 
like to wear hijab, but do not do so because of discrimination and/or harassment. The 
writer and lawyer Randa Abdel Fattah says that she stopped wearing hijab because it 
was a negatively-regarded form of dress in her chosen professional environment. She 
was not ‘forced’ to unveil, but nor did she ‘choose’ to do so, in the usual understanding 
of either word. Some women have been forcibly unveiled in street assaults, and this may 
deter them (and other women who hear of such incidents) from continuing to wear 
hijab. However, since women reach different decisions about whether or not to stop 
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wearing hijab in the face of such assaults, there is still a degree of agency involved. To 
describe this agency as ‘choice’ seems an overstatement; ‘negotiation’ seems closer to 
the mark.  
 
The hijab as a signifier of authenticity 
Paradoxically, the media, which is so often the vehicle for anti-Muslim sentiment in 
general and anti-hijab sentiment in particular, is also reinforcing the position of hijab 
among Australian Muslims. A disproportionate number of the Muslim women rendered 
‘visible’ in press photos and on TV wear hijab. In part, this is because the media seeks 
out interviewees from formal community organizations, and Muslim women who 
belong to such organizations are much more likely than average to wear hijab. Women 
interviewed at mosques or Islamic community centers and events are also likely to be 
wearing hijab on these occasions, even if they don’t do so in everyday life. However, 
for cameramen and photographers, the woman in hijab also represents the ‘money-shot’, 
the vital ingredient, for Islam-related stories. While no Muslim has ever explicitly 
suggested that I should immediately don a hijab, several journalists and editors in search 
of the ‘hijabi money-shot’ have done so, and on one occasion even suggested that I veil 
my computer as a novelty shot. Journalists with whom I have discussed this issue deny 
that this is a form of stereotyping, describing it instead as a visual ‘clue’ to the viewer, 
to let them know what the story is about. Regardless of intent, the high visibility of 
hijab in media representations of Muslim women reinforces the idea that it is what ‘real’ 
Muslim women wear. Non-Muslims who engage with ‘the Muslim community’ on a 
professional or organizational level (journalists, bureaucrats, service providers and the 
like) tend to regard the woman in hijab as the more ‘authentic’ Muslim and hence the 
more legitimate spokesperson (which is not to say that they regard her as an equal). 
 
Some Muslims are also absorbing media images of hijab as a mark of authenticity. 
Muslims may read Australian media in a more skeptical way than do non-Muslims, and 
they have sources of information (family, religious networks, etc) that are not available 
to non-Muslims. Nonetheless, mass media remains an important source of information 
for them on what being a Muslim ‘is’: negative images are simply inverted into positive 
ones. While Muslims frequently critique negative media representations of hijab-
wearing women, they apply less critical analysis to the media’s use of the hijab as 
symbol of Muslim authenticity. 
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Women who do not wear hijab are also regarded as somehow ‘less Muslim’ by some 
Muslims because they have not experienced the discrimination and harassment 
commonly directed at women in hijab. A woman who does not wear hijab is thought not 
to ‘really’ know what it is like to be a Muslim in contemporary Australia, because she 
supposedly has not experienced abuse in the name of her religion. Her life experience, 
then, is less ‘authentically’ Muslim. This raises another dilemma: how do I 
acknowledge the reality of discrimination and harassment against women wearing hijab 
and the resilience of such women in standing up to it, without by implication 
stigmatizing non-hijabis as somehow falling short? It is often said that wearing hijab 
requires “courage” in today’s Australia. This is true and deserves recognition. But this is 
difficult to do without implying that non-hijabis are somehow lacking in courage, which 
is not something that I accept about myself or about many other non-hijabis. Refusing to 
wear hijab in a community where it is fast becoming a symbol of cultural loyalty can 
require courage, too, especially if there is strong family pressure to do so. Any young 
woman worth her salt wants to be thought courageous, but courage is not exclusive to 
one form of dress. 
 
In fact, we should not assume that the experience of wearing hijab uniformly means that 
a woman attracts a higher degree of prejudice from non-Muslims, although this is by far 
the most usual scenario. Hijab is a highly visible marker of ‘Otherness’, but it is not the 
only one. Race and ethnicity may be obscured, but are not obliterated, by its presence or 
absence. A Muslim woman’s experience of racism is governed not only by whether she 
wears hijab, but also by her ethnicity, her physical location, the degree and nature of her 
interface with non-Muslims. In cases where she belongs to another stigmatized ‘out-
group’, wearing hijab may actually lead non-Muslims to treat her in a way that she finds 
more tolerable. The stigma attached to ‘Muslimness’ (terrorist, fanatic, victim of 
patriarchy) is not necessarily more intolerable than the stigma attached to ‘blackness’ 
(substance abuser, petty criminal), with blackness seen as a more likely immediate 
threat. One such young woman reported that “People [meaning non-Muslims] smile and 
talk to me when I wear hijab”. This experience suggests that the latent racism still held 
by many anti-racist whites renders them less nervous about being friendly to an 
unknown young Muslim woman than to an unknown young black woman. 
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There is no universal ‘life experience’ for Australian Muslim women, nor a universal 
life experience determined by whether or not they wear a headscarf. Commonalities and 
differences crisscross various forms of dress. The use of hijab as a mark of authenticity 
is generated by non-Muslims, but it is unreflectively absorbed by many Muslims. 
 
Talking on 
Besides the complexities outlined above, there are also strategic reasons why we need to 
continue to develop new ways of talking about hijab. Anti-hijab rhetoric seems to be 
shifting away from a simplistic representation of hijab as a symbol of patriarchal 
control, and towards rhetoric about hijab as a symbol of religious separatism, ‘chosen’ 
by women themselves. The discourse of ‘choice’ is relevant to the claims by those such 
as Leslie Cannold, who think the hijab should be banned from state schools because 
“rightly or wrongly, many Australians see the scarf as a symbol of the gender-based 
oppression women suffer in many non-Western countries” (Cannold 2005: np). 
However, to those such as Bronwyn Bishop who may draw selectively on feminist 
discourse when it suits them, but whose objection is based on the claim that hijabis 
“don’t fit in”, it doesn’t matter whether or not you ‘chose’ to wear the headscarf – it is 
still the wrong choice. It is an “icon of defiance” although still a mark of subservience – 
a blurring illustrated by Bishop saying that she could not: 
accept someone who wants to be a little bit of a slave, or a little bit 
subservient. The fact of the matter is that in this country, freedom is defined 
by our law, and that’s the standard, not somebody else’s definition of what 
they think freedom might be (ABC Radio National 2005). 
 
The complex terrain of this issue does not translate easily into media soundbites. 
‘Choice’ and ‘force’, whatever their limitations, at least make for a simple, direct 
message. ‘Negotiation’, while closer to the lived reality of many Muslim women’s lives, 
does not pack the same punch. ‘Freedom from coercion’ (whether by the state or by 
families and communities) might provide a more direct message than ‘choice’, since it 
more directly implies an ideal rather than an existing reality, and is less easily blurred 
into the qualified meanings that have attached themselves to ‘choice’. 
 
Communities that are fearful and besieged are unhealthy places for women. In such 
circumstances, the importance of women’s dress as a mark of cultural loyalty is 
heightened, and transgressions of such loyalty are regarded with greater seriousness. 
Both Australia as a whole and Australian Muslim communities are in different but 
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interlinked states of fear, and there are increasing demands from both sides that Muslim 
women display their cultural loyalty through their dress. If this social climate continues, 
the question will not be what a Muslim woman ‘chooses’ – it will be which side is able 
to wield the greater force. 
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